Optimistic contract signing protocols allow two parties to commit to a previously agreed upon contract, relying on a third party to abort or con rm the contract if needed. These protocols are relatively subtle, since there may be interactions between the subprotocols used for normal signing without the third party, aborting the protocol through the third party, or requesting con rmation from the third party. With the help of Mur', a nite-state veri cation tool, we analyze two related contract signing protocols: the optimistic contract signing protocol of Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner, and the abuse-free contract signing protocol of Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie. For the rst protocol, we discover that a malicious participant can produce inconsistent versions of the contract or mount a replay attack. For the second protocol, we discover that negligence or corruption of the trusted third party may allow abuse or unfairness. In this case, contrary to the intent of the protocol, the cheated party is not able to hold the third party accountable. We present and analyze modi cations to the protocols that avoid these problems and discuss the basic challenges involved in formal analysis of fair exchange protocols.
Introduction
Contracts are an important part of business. If two parties wish to sign a contract, but do not share other motives, then each may refuse to sign until the other has demonstrated its commitment to the contract. While simultaneous commitment to contracts printed on paper can be achieved by sitting at a table and signing identical paper copies, distributed contract signing over a network is inherently asymmetric: someone has to send the rst message. In one contemporary style of contract signing protocols, two rounds of communication are used. In the rst round, each party declares their willingness to be bound by the contract. In the second, they each send some remaining data needed to satisfy the de nition of signed contract established by the protocol. If a trusted third party is able to enforce the contract based on partial completion of the protocol, then it is possible to conduct distributed contract signing so that various symmetric correctness conditions are satis ed. In optimistic contract signing, the third party is only needed in case of a dispute. Otherwise, the protocol can be completed without involving the third party.
The most basic correctness condition for contract signing is called fairness. A contract signing protocol is fair if, after completion of the protocol, either both parties have a signed contract, or neither does. Another property is called accountability: if any party cheats by not following the steps required by the protocol, the resulting network messages will unambiguously show which party has cheated. Accountability is particularly desirable for the trusted third party, since the third party has the ability to resolve or abort a contract.
A more complex correctness condition, introduced in GJM99], has been called abuse-freeness. This condition is intended to guarantee that neither party has a speci c kind of advantage over the other during the execution of the protocol. To illustrate by example, suppose Alice agrees to sell her house to Bob and Bob signs a contract containing a certain price. If Alice holds the contract without signing, she can show the contract to a competing buyer Carol and convince Carol that she needs to pay more than Bob if she wants the house. This is disadvantageous for Bob, since information he provides to Alice as part of signing an agreed contract is used to Alice's advantage. In this scenario, abuse is possible only if Bob's signature on the contract is in a form that Carol can read and understand; this is necessary since Alice must convince Carol that she has the choice to accept Bob's o er or turn Bob down and sign a new contract with Carol. This kind of abuse can be prevented in physical simultaneous transactions, but it is di cult to prevent in distributed protocols since a sequential protocol has the potential to bind one party before the other.
In this paper, we describe the results of automated analysis of two optimistic contract signing protocols. The rst protocol was proposed by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner ASW98]; we shall refer to it as the ASW protocol. The ASW protocol uses standard cryptography and special forms of contract to guarantee fairness and accountability of the trusted third party. The second protocol was proposed by Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie GJM99]; we shall refer to it as the GJM protocol. It relies on a cryptographic construct called private contract signature to guarantee abuse-freeness in addition to fairness and third party accountability.
Using a nite-state enumeration tool called Mur', we verify correctness properties claimed for the protocols and uncover several weaknesses. The process of using Mur' involves formulating the protocol and potential attacks in a simplied programming language and allowing Mur' to exhaustively try all possible attacks on all possible protocol runs (within certain bounds on the number of protocol instances considered in a run). Since the number of states explored is enormous, the only output of Mur' that bears repeating in a technical paper are the speci c runs that lead to failure of one or more correctness conditions. For those interested in the form of the input language, the general method for analyzing security protocols, or the methods employed in the implementation of Mur', additional details may be found in Dil96, Mur, MMS97] . Since the most complicated issue in carrying out a Mur' analysis of a contract signing protocol are the high-level decisions on how to formalize the protocol, how to account for dishonest participants or an external attacker, and how to formulate the correctness conditions, the paper focuses on these issues and the results of the analysis.
Our nite-state analysis of the ASW protocol shows that a malicious protocol participant is able to obtain a valid contract while the honest participant, even by requesting help from the trusted third party, can only obtain a replacement contract which is inconsistent with the one possessed by the malicious participant. The same protocol weakness also allows the intruder to stage a replay attack.
Our nite-state analysis of the GJM protocol reveals an attack that leads to the loss of abuse-freeness and third party accountability. Speci cally, the contract initiator, O, using a weak form of passive assistance (or information leak) from the third party, is able to choose whether to reveal a completed contract or accept an abort token provided by the third party. Furthermore, if O chooses to reveal its completed contract, and the discrepancy with R's abort token is observed, it is not possible to determine whether the third party participated in the inconsistency or not.
Although the sequences of actions demonstrating these weaknesses are relatively short and easy to follow, the analysis is subtle in several respects. First, both sequences involve interaction between the optimistic two-party transaction normally used to sign a contract, the abort protocol used by one party to time out and stop the protocol, and the resolve protocol used to request enforcement by the third party. As a result of the number of possible interactions between these three subprotocols, we did not suspect any problems until our analysis tool uncovered violations of one of our correctness conditions. Only then, after examining the traces provided, were we able to isolate speci c aspects of the protocols that allow the attacks. More generally, the power of nite-state analysis lies in the ability to consider all possible interleavings of actions, including possible runs that are counterintuitive or not expected by designers of the protocol. Although we do not wish to fault the authors for an honest mistake, this point is supported by review of the GJM correctness proof. The proof printed in GJM99] proceeds by considering a number of cases but overlooks the speci c sequence of actions uncovered by our exhaustive brute-force analysis. While humans generally prefer to reason using general concepts that seem to cover all of the relevant phenomena, nite-state analysis examines all runs methodically and exhaustively, often uncovering problems that could otherwise go undetected.
For both protocols, we suggest simple changes that prevent the attacks. For the GJM protocol, the same repair was also proposed by the authors of the protocol after we described the attack Mac99]. The repaired protocols appear to be correct, at least within the accuracy of our model; Mur' analysis does not suggest any errors. We also show that some assumptions about the communication channels can be relaxed without violating fairness or other intended properties of the protocols.
There is some subtlety in the way that the basic protocol requirements, fairness, abuse-freeness, and accountability, are speci ed. For example an abort message from the trusted third party does not mean that no participant will receive a contract. Abort simply means that the third party will not subsequently con rm the contract. This is inherent in optimistic two-party protocols: after the protocol has nished without involving the third party, one of the parties can ask the third party to abort the protocol and the third party, having received no previous messages, is engineered to oblige. Another subtlety surrounds abuse-freeness, which is an assertion about choices at intermediate states in the execution of the protocol. Abuse-freeness is not a property that can be determined by examining individual traces of protocol execution independently. Since Mur' is a trace-based tool, we had to devise some extension of the protocol environment, involving an outside party who issues sign and abort challenges, in order to automatically verify the states in which one participant has the power to determine the eventual outcome of the protocol. ZG96] , using process failures to express fairness as a liveness property. In our approach, we model fairness by a set of state invariants as described in section 5.1, and verify a wider set of protocol properties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides background on fair exchange protocols and the formal tool we used for our analysis, section 3 describes the ASW protocol, and section 4 speci es the correctness conditions for optimistic contract signing protocols. Section 5 deals with the issues involved in formal modeling of fair exchange. Results of the analysis and suggested repairs to the ASW protocol are presented in section 6. Section 7 describes the GJM protocol, which is then analyzed in section 8. Brief concluding remarks appear in section 9.
Preliminary accounts of the protocol analyses presented in this paper were previously published in conference proceedings SM00a,SM00b].
Background

Overview of Mur'
Mur' Dil96] is a nite-state machine veri cation tool. Originally developed for hardware veri cation, Mur' has been successfully used for analyzing security protocols MMS97,MSS98,SS98]. The Mur' input language is a simple high-level language for describing nondeterministic nite-state machines. The input model consists of the description of variables that de ne the state of the system and a set of guarded rules that represent actions. While there is no explicit notion of process, a process can be implicitly modeled by a set of related rules. Communication between processes is modeled by shared variables. The Mur' system automatically checks, by explicit state enumeration, if every reachable state of the model satis es a given set of invariants.
To analyze a security protocol in Mur', it is necessary to combine the nitestate model of the protocol expressed in the Mur' language with the intruder model, specify the start state of the protocol, and formally state protocol invariants as boolean conditions that must be true in every state reachable from the start state. The intruder model typically consists of a set of variables that contain the intruder's knowledge and a set of actions that the intruder may take. We use a very simple, mechanical intruder model. The intruder is assumed to have full control over the public network and allowed to take the following actions: (1) overhear every message, decrypt encrypted messages if it has the key, store parts of message in its internal database, (2) intercept messages and remove them from the network, (3) generate messages using any combination of its initial knowledge, parts of overheard messages, known keys, and other data available to it. If at any moment there are several possible actions that the intruder can take, one is chosen nondeterministically. The Mur' system will analyze all states that are reachable via any interleaving of enabled actions.
Limitations of this approach include the fact that our intruder model has no notion of partial information or probability. It cannot perform cryptanalysis or statistical tests of the network tra c, and it follows the \black box" cryptography model: an encrypted message can be read only if the decrypting key is known, otherwise its contents are assumed to be invisible to the intruder (who is still capable of storing the message and replaying it later in a di erent context).
If Mur' nds a reachable state in which an invariant is violated, it outputs the sequence of rules leading to it from the start state. This sequence e ectively describes the attack. If Mur' fails to nd an invariant violation, this is not a proof that the protocol is correct. Since Mur' can only consider nite models, the number of protocol instances under analysis must be bounded. Therefore, if an attack on the protocol requires a certain number of protocol instances and the size of the analyzed model is less than the threshold, the attack will not be discovered. Also, certain kinds of attacks, in particular attacks involving cryptanalysis, are beyond the scope of the model. In the rest of the paper, we refer to this intruder model as the Dolev Gradual exchange protocols BOGMR90, Dam95] work by having the parties release their secrets in small installments, thus ensuring that at any given moment no party has a signi cant advantage. The drawback of this approach is that a large number of communication steps between the parties is required. Gradual exchange is also problematic if the items to be exchanged have \threshold" value (either the item is valuable, or it is not).
Another category of fair exchange protocols is based on the notion of a trusted third party, for example CTS95,ZG96,DGLW96]. The trusted third party supervises communication between the protocol participants and ensures that no participant receives the item it wants before releasing its own item. Variations of this approach include fair exchange protocols with a semi-trusted third party FR97]. The main drawback of the third party solution is that the third party may become the communication bottleneck if it has to be involved in all instances of the protocol in order to guarantee fairness. The protocol may also need to impose demands on the communication channels, e.g., by requiring that all messages are eventually delivered to their intended recipients.
Recently, several protocols have been proposed for optimistic fair exchange ASW98,BDM98,GJM99]. While the third party T may need to be trusted by all parties to the exchange, T needs to act only if one of the parties misbehaves or there is a communication failure. This may ease the communication bottleneck associated with T, making fair exchange more practical for realistic applications.
The contract signing protocol of Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie GJM99] extends the concept of fairness by introducing the notion of abuse-freeness. Informally, a protocol is abuse-free if neither participant can prove to an outside party that it has the power to abort the protocol or successfully complete contract negotiation. In nancial applications, the ability to prove that one can resolve or abort a particular contract negotiation may be as important as the actual signing of a contract, making abuse-freeness critical for fair exchange protocols to be deployed in the nancial arena.
3 Asokan-Shoup-Waidner Protocol
In this section, we describe the optimistic contract signing protocol by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner ASW98] (the ASW protocol). We start by giving a highlevel description of the objectives of the protocol and the assumptions under which it operates, and then explain the protocol steps in detail. The notation has been changed from the original paper to facilitate explanation.
It is worth noting that, intuitively, one might expect a contract to be a pair of digital signatures of an agreed upon text, one signature from each party negotiating the contract. This is not the case in the ASW protocol. Normal termination without use of the third party will produce a contract that contains two digital signatures and additional data generated in the run of the protocol. However, the contracts produced by the third party are not necessarily of this form. In order to understand the ASW protocol, it is important to keep in mind not only the steps of each subprotocol (discussed below), but also the forms of contract that the protocol designers have established for the protocol.
Objectives
The ASW protocol is designed to enable two parties, called O (originator) and R (responder), to obtain each other's commitment on a previously agreed contractual text. The protocol is asynchronous. As the exchange subprotocol progresses, either participant may contact the trusted third party T. The third party may decide, on the basis of communication it has received, whether to issue a replacement contract or an abort token. Abort tokens are not a proof that the exchange has been canceled, as explained below.
Assumptions
The protocol uses conventional, universally-veri able digital signatures and a hash function. We write S-Sig i (: : :) for a message signed by party i and assume that all protocol participants have the ability to verify signatures produced by any party. We also assume that there exists a collision-resistant one-way hash function, hash().
Prior to executing the protocol, the parties are assumed to agree on each other's identity, the identity of the trusted third party T, and the contractual text. It is also assumed that every protocol participant knows everybody else's signature veri cation key, which is typically the public key. This implies that the protocol must be preceded by the \handshake" phase in which a key exchange and/or authentication protocol is executed to establish the shared initial knowledge. Since it is not necessary for the handshake protocol to guarantee fairness, we do not consider it as part of this study.
The original paper ASW98] states that the communication channels between any two protocol participants are assumed to be con dential, i.e., eavesdroppers will not be able to determine the contents of messages traveling through these channels. This can be achieved by encrypting all messages with the intended recipient's public key. It is also assumed that the channels between each participant and the trusted third party T are resilient, i.e., any message deposited into the channel will eventually be delivered to its intended recipient. However, there are no time guarantees: the intruder can succeed in delaying messages by an arbitrary, but nite amount of time. In section 6 below, we analyze the protocol under various assumptions about the quality of communication channels.
Implicit in the protocol speci cation is the assumption that the trusted third party T must maintain a permanent database with the status of every protocol run that it has ever been asked to abort or resolve. (Each run can be identi ed by the rst message me 1 | see below.) Abort and resolve requests are processed by T on the rst-come, rst-served basis. Therefore, in order to ensure fairness, T must always be able to determine whether a particular instance of the protocol has been aborted or resolved already.
Protocol
The ASW protocol consists of three interdependent subprotocols: exchange, abort, and resolve. The parties (O and R) generally start the exchange by following the exchange subprotocol. If both O and R are honest and there is no interference from the network, each obtains a valid contract upon the completion of the exchange subprotocol. The originator O also has the option of requesting the trusted third party T to abort an exchange that O has initiated. To do so, O executes the abort subprotocol with T. Finally, both O and R may each request that T resolve an exchange that has not been completed. After receiving the initial message of the exchange protocol, they may do so by executing the resolve subprotocol with T.
At the end of the protocol, each party is guaranteed to end up with a valid contract or an abort token. As described brie y above, the protocol de nition in ASW98] provides two forms of contract: An abort token should not be interpreted as a proof that the exchange has been canceled. The protocol does not prevent a dishonest O from obtaining an abort token after signing the contract with R. (In this case, O may have both the abort token and the contract, while R only has the contract). The protocol is designed, however, to prevent one party from receiving only the abort token in any situation where the other can receive a valid contract.
Exchange subprotocol. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that prior to initiating the exchange, the two parties agree on the contractual text (text) and the identity of the trusted third party T. Since T stores the result of aborting (indicated by aborted := true) in its permanent database, an abort token is e ectively a promise by T that it will not resolve this instance of the protocol in the future. As mentioned above, an abort token is not a proof that the exchange has been aborted, as the parties can complete contract signing without involving T if they follow the exchange subprotocol.
It is useful to bear in mind that while an honest O may send an abort request to T if it does not receive me 2 within a reasonable time, there is no guarantee that O will be able to abort. If the exchange has been already resolved by someone who knows both me 1 and me 2 , T will not grant the abort request and will send O a replacement contract instead | even if O has not received me 2 . Note also that even though R is not allowed to send abort requests to T, this does not put R at a disadvantage since it has the option of simply ignoring all messages from O.
Resolve subprotocol. Either party may request that T resolve the exchange. In order to do so, the party must possess both me 1 and me 2 . Therefore, R can send a resolve request at any time after receiving me 1 , and O can do so at any time after receiving me 2 . When T receives a resolve request, it checks whether me 1 is already marked as aborted. If it is, T replies with the abort token, otherwise it marks me 1 as resolved and generates a replacement contract by counter-signing the resolve request.
Below, we show the resolve protocol between R and T. Although the generated contract has a di erent form than the contract produced by the exchange subprotocol, the protocol design assumes that in any transaction requiring a contract, either form would be accepted as binding. In other words, the protocol designers consider the de nition of contract to be part of the protocol speci cation and choose to use two forms of valid contract in their protocol. Note, however, that the speci cation does not indicate how two contracts that have the same form but contain contradictory information (e.g., di erent nonces) should be treated.
The rst request received by T determines the permanent status of the protocol. After T resolves or aborts the protocol for the rst time, it should send identical replies in response to all future requests. If the rst request to reach T is an abort request from O, T's response to all requests will be the abort token. If the rst request to reach T is a resolve request from O or R, T's response to all requests will be the replacement contract. This leads to an implicit race condition which is not, however, a violation of fairness requirements as de ned in section 4.
Correctness conditions
In this section, we specify the correctness conditions that must be satis ed by an optimistic contract signing protocol. To simplify the presentation, we combine the guarantees for ASW ASW98] and GJM GJM99] protocols into one set of properties. Even though the two papers employ slightly di erent terminology, the fairness properties they consider are essentially identical, with the exception of abuse-freeness. Both protocols claim that the properties will be satis ed assuming that the communication channels are resilient, i.e., messages can be arbitrarily delayed and/or scheduled, but will be eventually delivered to their intended recipients.
Fairness. Fairness for protocol participants involves several conditions:
It is impossible for a corrupt participant to obtain a valid contract without allowing the remaining participant to also obtain a valid contract. Another way of stating this ASW98] is that when the protocol has completed, either both O and R have valid contracts, or neither one does.
Once an honest participant obtains a cancelation message (i.e., an abort token) from the trusted third party T, it is impossible for any other participant to obtain a valid contract. Every honest participant is guaranteed to complete the protocol.
Trusted third party accountability. If the trusted third party T can be forced to eventually send a valid reply to every request, then any participant who is cheated as a result of T's misbehavior will be able to prove that T misbehaved in an external dispute. It is not speci ed precisely what can serve as a proof of misbehavior, but typically such proof consists of two contradictory messages signed by T ASW97], e.g., an abort token and a replacement contract.
Abuse-freeness. The ASW protocol ASW98] is not designed to guarantee this property, but we mention it here for the sake of uniformity. A protocol is abuse-free if it is impossible for a protocol participant, at any point in the protocol, to be able to prove to an outside party that he has the power to choose between aborting and successfully completing the contract. One of the main contributions of GJM99] is to introduce the notion of abuse-freeness to electronic contract signing.
There are other properties supported by the protocols, such as timeliness and non-repudiability, but we did not model them formally and omit them for the purposes of this analysis.
5 Formal modeling Section 2.1 described our general approach to protocol analysis, which involves modeling protocol participants and the adversary as non-deterministic nitestate machines. This allows violations of correctness conditions to be detected by fully automated, exhaustive search of the resulting state space. In this section, we focus on the modeling issues arising in the application of nitestate analysis to fair exchange protocols.
Fair exchange protocols present several challenges. To begin with, fairness invariants may be di cult to express precisely, given only an informal protocol speci cation. Second, since fair exchange protocols are designed to protect honest participants from being cheated by a misbehaving counterpart, it is necessary to model malicious or corrupt protocol participants in addition to the standard network-based intruder. Third, fair exchange protocols with the trusted third party typically provide a guarantee of third party veri ability or accountability, promising that any loss of fairness resulting from the third party's corruption can be traced and proven to an outside arbiter. These guarantees are di cult to understand and formalize for automated veri cation. There are also challenges associated with abuse-freeness.
Modeling fairness
Mur', the nite-state veri cation tool we used to perform the analyses described in this paper, can only search for violations of state invariants. In general, liveness properties such as fairness cannot be expressed in the Mur' language. This leads some researchers to prefer more expressive tools. For instance, in Sch98] fairness properties of the Zhou-Gollmann non-repudiation protocol ZG96] are expressed as predicates on process failures. However, the fairness conditions de ned in section 4 can be expressed as safety properties.
To formulate fairness as a safety property, we only verify fairness in the states in which an honest participant cannot perform any action according to the protocol speci cation. We will call such states participant-terminal. 
Soundness
Monotonicity. The soundness of our formulation of fairness, explained in section 5.1 above, follows from the fact that fairness for these protocols is monotonic. In other words, if a run of a protocol ceases to be fair at some point, then it remains unfair for the remainder of the run. More speci cally, if the protocol reaches a state S E in which one party has a contract, and the other has no means of obtaining one, then this condition will hold true in all subsequent states no matter what actions the cheated party undertakes. If this were not true and there existed a sequence of actions that brings the protocol to a state in which the cheated party obtains a contract, then fairness would not have been violated in state S E , and we arrive at a contradiction.
Therefore, we need not be concerned with discovering fairness violations in the intermediate states where they must be expressed as liveness properties (e.g., \O has no means of obtaining a valid contract", or \no contract will be available to O in the future"). Every such violation is preserved in all subsequent states, some of which are participant-terminal. Therefore, we can simply let the protocol run its course, and search for fairness violations only in the participant-terminal states, where they can be expressed as safety properties (e.g., \R has a contract, but O doesn't").
To complete the argument that our formulation is correct, we need to show that every protocol instance will reach a participant-terminal state even if fairness has been violated in an intermediate state. The argument relies on the following three properties:
Finiteness. All execution sequences of the protocol are nite.
Progress of honest participants. For each honest protocol participant P and each state S i , we can de ne S i jP to be the partial state consisting only of P's private state variables. S i jP can be thought of as P's view of what is happening in the protocol. Obviously, it is possible that S i jP = S j jP for some i and j, i.e., di erent states may project to the same partial state as far as P is concerned.
For each honest participant P, the protocol speci cation provides a complete ordering of S i jP . Each time P sends or receives a message, it progresses to the next state, eventually reaching the end of its execution sequence. Once P leaves a state, it cannot reach it again. For example, in the ASW protocol (section 3.3), O starts in the partial state where it is ready to send message me 1 , then progresses to the state where it has dispatched me 1 and is waiting for me 2 , then to the state where it has received me 2 , sent me 3 , and is waiting for me 4 , and nally reaches the participant-terminal state (represented by O.state = M_DONE in the code sample above) where it has received me 4 and considers the protocol completed.
Channel resilience. In the protocols discussed in this paper, all communication channels are assumed to be resilient, i.e., it is guaranteed that every message will be eventually delivered. Therefore, we can assume that every honest participant will progress to the end of its execution sequence even if a successful attack on fairness was staged in an intermediate state. In the example above, this means the protocol will reach a state S such that S jO is considered by O to be a terminal state, i.e., O.state = M_DONE. Channel resilience is a fairly realistic assumption for real-world networks. In fact, if channels are non-resilient, then the intruder can defeat any protocol by simply intercepting messages and preventing them from reaching their intended recipients.
The modeling technique presented in this section extends the applicability of fully automated nite-state analysis to a large class of fairness properties while keeping the formalism conceptually simple and restricted to safety properties. There is an e ciency cost. If we could discover fairness violations immediately in the states where they rst occur instead of delaying the discovery until the cheated participant reaches the end of its execution sequence, we would not need to generate all the state subspaces rooted in the violating states. The exact number of states that are generated unnecessarily cannot be estimated in general as it depends on the particular protocol and the nature of the attack that leads to the loss of fairness. E ectively, the tradeo is between running a simple, robust, well-understood nite-state analysis tool such as Mur' for a bit longer, and modeling the entire protocol in a richer formalism that allows direct expression of liveness properties.
Modeling trusted third party accountability
Accountability only holds if the trusted third party is guaranteed to send a valid response to all requests. Also, O must be noti ed whenever R tries to enforce a contract, and vice versa. If a protocol participant does not know that it is being cheated, it cannot go after T to prove its misbehavior.
Before formulating a formal protocol invariant that could be veri ed with the help of Mur', it is necessary to determine what it means to be able to prove T's misbehavior. Based on our interpretation of the protocol description in ASW98], we believe that the cheated protocol participant can prove that T misbehaved if and only if it can produce two documents, both signed by T, that contradict each other. More speci cally, the cheated participant must be able to demonstrate an abort token signed by T and a replacement contract for the same instance of the protocol, also signed by T. Since T is supposed to process all abort and resolve requests on the rst-come, rst-served basis and the initial request determines the status of the protocol in perpetuity, it should never be the case that T issues both an abort token and a replacement contract for the same instance of the protocol.
Based on the above interpretation, we believe that third party accountability is violated if and only if the following conditions hold (the conditions are formulated assuming that O is the cheated party; the conditions for R are symmetric):
T is corrupt (see section 5.5 These conditions can be modeled by simple state invariants. Therefore, trusted third party accountability can be veri ed with the help of Mur'.
Modeling abuse-freeness
Unlike basic fairness, abuse-freeness is not a monotonic property, and cannot be easily converted into a safety guarantee. Both fairness and abuse-freeness are assertions about future executions. Fairness violations, however, are existential properties of traces and can thus be found by analyzing each trace separately (e.g., \there exists a trace such that O has R's valid contract, but R cannot obtain O's valid contract by following the protocol speci cation"). Therefore, we can convert fairness conditions into safety properties to be evaluated in terminal states as described in section 5.1, and delay the discovery of violations until the trace has completed.
Violations of abuse-freeness, on the other hand, are universal properties of traces (\for all possible traces, one of the parties can a) determine the outcome of the protocol, and b) prove this ability to an outside party"). They only occur in intermediate states, before a particular execution sequence has been chosen by the participants, and cannot be discovered by analyzing the terminal state of an individual trace.
Our partial approach to verifying whether abuse-freeness is violated in the protocol consists of two stages. First, we use Mur' to determine whether any protocol participant possesses the power to determine the outcome of the protocol regardless of the actions of the other party, assuming the other party is honest and genuinely interested in signing the contract. This is done by augmenting the system with an additional outside party we call the Challenger.
In order to verify whether a participant P has the power at some point in the protocol, we have it send a message to the Challenger asserting its control over the outcome. The Challenger then nondeterministically chooses a desired outcome: abort or successful contract completion. (It is a consequence of fairness that there are only two possible outcomes: either T aborts and no one receives a signed contract or both parties receive a signed contract.)
After receiving the Challenger's request, P has to interact with the honest participant in such a way so as to drive the protocol to the requested outcome. If there exists a trace in which the outcome of the protocol is not consistent with that requested by the Challenger, we conclude that P does not possess the power to determine the outcome. The key idea here is that determining whether P satis es the Challenger's request is a state invariant and can be veri ed by Mur'.
The second part of violation is that a participant P with the power to determine the outcome must be able to prove this to an outside arbiter. However, we have not formulated a straightforward way of verifying properties such as \P can prove something" in Mur'. Therefore, we have only analyzed this part of the protocol by informal means.
Our analysis of abuse-freeness of the original and repaired GJM protocols can be found in sections 8.3 and 8.4, respectively.
Modeling corrupt participants
Fair exchange protocols must protect an honest participant from being cheated by a malicious counterpart. Therefore, analysis of a fair exchange protocol must consider the possibility of one or more participants becoming corrupt and cooperating with the intruder. In our formal model, we keep the intruder and the malicious protocol participant separate. This enables us to consider several conceptual levels of corruption. Distinguishing between them is useful for analyzing real-world implications of the protocols.
In the simplest case, the corrupt participant is assumed to share its private key with the intruder, enabling the latter to sign and decrypt messages on its behalf. This is equivalent to the intruder using the corrupt party as an oracle for signing and decrypting messages. We will call such collaboration with the intruder strong corruption. We do not consider the case when a party divulges its private key to everybody since it can be represented by sending all messages encrypted with that key in plaintext.
A weaker form of corruption occurs when a protocol participant does not share its key with the intruder, and does not sign any messages it is not supposed to sign in the normal course of the protocol. However, it may be willing to engage the intruder's help in obtaining an unfair advantage in the exchange or contract signing process. This may involve accepting messages from the intruder and lying to an outside party about their source, e.g., by claiming that they arrived from the protocol counterpart or T through the standard communication channels. We will call this weak corruption.
A weakly corrupt protocol participant is akin to a fence who is willing to accept hot goods without asking too many questions but will not do anything overtly illegal himself. A contract signing protocol that does not protect an honest participant from being cheated by a weakly corrupt counterpart defeats its own purpose and is largely useless. In the real world, it is impossible to be sure that an untrusted agent is not weakly corrupt, i.e., that it is not acting in collusion with the intruder who has control over the public network on which the contract is negotiated.
The weakest form of corruption is the case when a participant, perhaps unintentionally, gives the intruder an ability to monitor (but not to modify or re-schedule) all incoming network tra c. This kind of corruption does not require that the corrupt party has a malicious intent. All the intruder needs is an oversight in network protection. For example, careless disposal of incoming messages may enable the intruder to root through the garbage and read all discarded messages. We will call this form of corruption accidental corruption.
Analysis of the ASW Protocol
In order to search for protocol errors, we implemented the exchange, abort, and resolve subprotocols in the Mur' language. The protocol was combined with the standard intruder model described in section 2.1. The correctness conditions of section 4 were stated as Mur' invariants. During state exploration, Mur' checks that each invariant holds in every reachable state. Conditions such as timeliness and non-repudiability cannot be trivially represented as state invariants, and we have not veri ed them formally.
Our rst attempt to analyze the protocol failed because according to the protocol speci cation, the trusted third party T is always ready to accept abort and resolve requests. Therefore, if one of the parties is strongly corrupt (i.e., the intruder has access to its signing key | see section 5.5), then in every state of the protocol the intruder can generate a new resolve or, if O is the corrupt party, abort request and send it to T. The trusted third party will then add the request to its database, resulting in a new, larger state. This makes the state space of the protocol in nite. The only solution is to arbitrarily limit the number of times the intruder can generate a request to T in the course of one instance of the protocol. This restriction is not necessary if there are no corrupt parties, since there is only a nite number of frivolous requests that can be computed by the intruder. However, Mur' analysis is slowed down considerably if in every state there is an enabled rule allowing the intruder to send a request to T.
This section describes the results of our analysis with the intruder limited to no more than 2 requests to T per protocol instance. We only present analysis of fairness and omit that of trusted third party accountability since we did not discover any interesting behaviors in which accountability is violated.
Fairness
As a reminder, fairness guarantees that when the protocol has completed, either both protocol participants have valid contracts, or neither one does (see section 4).
Con dential channels, one instance of the protocol. First, we analyzed one run, or instance of the protocol under the assumption that all communication channels are con dential. This prevents the intruder from learning anything from the messages as they pass through the network. The only operation the intruder can perform in this setting is to store a message and replay it later. Mur' did not discover any violations of fairness. It did discover that the intruder can achieve the following:
Prevent O from aborting the protocol by delaying its abort request to T until R computes me 2 , and then submitting me 1 and me 2 (ostensibly from R) to T, thus resolving the protocol. Then O will receive a replacement contract in response to its abort request. Force O to submit an abort request to T by delaying me 2 . Force R (respectively, O) to submit a resolve request to T by delaying me 3 (me 4 ). Resolve the protocol directly by submitting a resolve request to T once both me 1 and me 2 have been sent into the network as part of the exchange subprotocol.
None of the above, however, is a violation of fairness as de ned in section 4.
Con dential channels, two instances of the protocol. After increasing the bound on the number of protocol instances, Mur' discovered the following replay To stage this attack, the intruder must observe an instance of the protocol, recording all messages sent by O. After the protocol completes, the intruder can initiate another instance of the protocol by replaying the recorded me 1 . R will respond with a new me 0 2 , to which the intruder responds with the old me 3 . The result of this attack is that the intruder can get R to commit to the text of an old contract with O without O's or T's knowledge.
The protocol as described in ASW98] contains no protection against this kind of attack. Perhaps this was a conscious decision on the part of the protocol designers who did not intend the protocol to be secure against replay attacks. If the contractual text contains a timestamp, expiration date, or some other information that might help in determining its freshness, R may be able to detect the attack. It can be argued that any well-written contract must contain such information. However, this should be stated explicitly as part of the protocol speci cation and not left for the protocol user to infer.
The replay attack discovered by Mur' is di erent from the simpler one in which a malicious R keeps the old contract to which O had previously committed and tries to reuse it. In case of our replay attack, the new contract is di erent from the old one. Recall that a standard contract is the combination of me 1 , me 2 , and contract authenticators: fme 1 ; me 2 ; N O ; N R g. Since me 2 is di erent in the second instance of the protocol, the contract is di erent. This implies that O cannot even obtain a valid replacement contract by requesting it from the trusted third party since in order to do so, it needs me 0 2 which it never receives. In fact, O is not even aware that an exchange between R and the intruder has taken place.
The replay attack succeeds even if both O and R are honest. Suppose that O is a retailer who periodically purchases supplies from R online using the contract signing protocol. All purchase contracts are exactly the same, as is often the case in real life, and it is agreed (o ine) that all contracts expire immediately upon ful llment (i.e., R receives the order, lls it, and forgets about it). Then the intruder can use the replay attack to impersonate O and submit a false purchase contract on its behalf, convincing R that O has committed to a new purchase and providing R with a false proof of O's commitment.
Note that there is no need for the intruder to involve the trusted third party in the protocol in order to stage the replay attack. This means that there will be no evidence of the attack such as could have been provided by a resolve request kept by T.
The main weakness of the protocol is the fact that O's message me 3 that contains the contract authenticator is sent in response to R's commitment message me 2 but is not related to it in any way, making it possible for the intruder to replay an old me 3 . A small repair to the protocol that prevents the attack is described in section 6.2.
Standard channels. After repairing the protocol to prevent the replay attack, we performed Mur' analysis without the con dentiality assumption on the channels but still within the constraints of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model (see section 2.1). Mur' did not discover any new attacks. This can be attributed to the fact that messages me 1;2 , ma 1;2 , and mr 2 are all signed, and mr 1 contains signed messages as its components. Assuming that every protocol participant knows everybody else's correct public key (this is a necessary requirement for the protocol to succeed even in the absence of the intruder), signatures prevents the intruder from modifying messages in transit. Since no signing keys are transmitted as part of the protocol, the intruder cannot gain the ability to sign messages unless one of the parties leaks its key. Therefore, the intruder is just as powerful as in the case of con dential channels.
This result suggests that the channel con dentiality assumption can be relaxed. The protocol ensures fairness even if the channels are controlled by a Dolev-Yao intruder. This is a problem, since each party possesses a valid contract, but the two contracts are inconsistent. Recall that the protocol employs a non-standard de nition of contracts (section 3.3), according to which a valid contract is more than a signed contractual text. Even though the contractual texts in the two contracts are the same, the random numbers and commitments are di erent, and it is unclear how the contracts should be enforced or interpreted, given that both are valid according to the protocol speci cation. The original paper ASW98] does not say anything about how this situation should be handled. This problem is caused by the same weakness of the protocol that makes the replay attack possible. O's contract authenticator N O is sent in response to me 2 but is not explicitly linked to it. This enables R to use N O with a di erent message me 0 2 to form a valid contract without revealing its own commitment to O. More generally, Mur' analysis points to the fact that O's half of the contract contains no information that links it to R's half of the contract. The modi cation of the protocol described in section 6.2 prevents this attack, too.
Repairing the protocol
The ASW protocol can be repaired so as to prevent the attacks described in section 6.1 by explicitly linking message me 3 with message me 2 . This is a standard technique to ensure that an old me 3 cannot be replayed by the intruder in response to a fresh me 2 and that R can obtain a standard contract only with the same contract authenticator that it has sent to O as part of me 2 . A similar change must be made to me 4 to prevent a symmetric replay attack. The security of the repaired protocol against replay attacks is strengthened by the fact that cryptographically secure signature schemes are necessarily indeterministic, therefore, even if the same text is signed in two separate instances of the protocol, the resulting messages will be di erent.
Garay-Jakobsson-MacKenzie Protocol
In this section, we describe the abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocol of Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie GJM99]. The protocol is closely related to the ASW protocol described above. Both involve a 4-step exchange subprotocol, and similar abort and resolve subprotocols. Even though the two protocols have similar structure, the actual contents of the messages di er. Unlike the ASW protocol, the GJM protocol is designed to guarantee abusefreeness in addition to fairness and third party accountability.
This section follows the pattern of section 3. We start by brie y describing the objectives of the GJM protocol, explain the properties of private contract signatures (PCS), an innovation of Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie used to make contract signing abuse-free, and describe the protocol steps in detail.
Objectives and assumptions
The GJM protocol is designed to enable two parties, O and R, to exchange signatures on a contractual text. It is assumed that prior to executing the protocol, the parties agree on each other's identity, the contractual text, and the identity of the trusted third party T. Every protocol participant is assumed to know the correct signature veri cation key of the other party and T. As above, we write S-Sig i (m) for the result of signing text m with the key of party i. It is also assumed that every participant has a private communication channel with T.
The protocol is asynchronous. As the exchange protocol progresses, either participant may contact the trusted third party T. The third party may decide, on the basis of the communication it received, to either resolve the protocol by issuing the other party's signature, or \abort" the protocol by issuing an abort token. As in the ASW protocol, abort tokens are not a proof that the exchange has been canceled. The intruder may schedule messages and insert its own messages in the network, but cannot delay messages sent between participants and T inde nitely.
Private Contract Signatures
The GJM protocol relies on the cryptographic primitive called private contract signature (PCS). We write PCS O (m; R; T) for party O's private contract signature of text m for party R (known as the designated veri er) with respect to third party T. The main properties of PCS are summarized below: PCS O (m; R; T) can be veri ed like a conventional signature, i.e., there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm PCS-Ver such that PCS-Ver(m; O; R; T; s) is true i s = PCS O (m; R; T). PCS O (m; R; T) can be feasibly computed by either O, or R, but nobody else. This is the key property of PCS that distinguishes it from a conventional, universally-veri able signature, as the latter can only be computed by O. When the designated veri er R receives s = PCS O (m; R; T), he will be convinced that s was computed by O, but, unlike O's conventional signature, s cannot be used by R to prove this to an outside party. PCS O (m; R; T) can be converted into a conventional signature by either O, or T, but nobody else, including R. For the purposes of this study, we focus on the third-party accountable version of PCS, in which the converted signatures produced by O and T can be distinguished. We will call them S-Sig O (m) and T-Sig O (m), respectively. Unlike PCS, converted signatures are universally veri able by anybody in possession of the correct signature veri cation key.
An e cient discrete log-based PCS scheme is presented in GJM99].
Protocol
The GJM protocol consists of three interdependent subprotocols: exchange, abort, and resolve. Message sequences are identical to those of the ASW protocol (see section 3.3). The parties (O and R) start the exchange by following the exchange subprotocol. If both O and R are honest and there is no interference from the network, they obtain each other's signatures as the nal steps of the exchange subprotocol. The originator O also has the option of requesting the trusted third party T to abort an exchange that O has initiated. To do so, O executes the abort subprotocol with T. Finally, both O and R may each request that T resolve an exchange that has not been completed. After receiving the initial message of the exchange protocol, they may do so by executing the resolve subprotocol with T. 
Correctness conditions
Correctness conditions for the GJM protocol are e ectively the same as those for the ASW protocol, and can be found in section 4 above. In addition to fairness, the GJM protocol is designed to be abuse-free.
There are actually two versions of the GJM protocol, one providing third party accountability and the other not. The di erence between the two protocols lies in two versions of PCS. In our analysis, we focus on the case when the PCS scheme provides third-party accountability, i.e., the distributions of S-Sig i (m) and T-Sig i (m) are disjoint, and thus it is possible for the veri er to distinguish whether the signature is a \real" signature of i, or a PCS of i converted by T. Since the steps of the protocol do not allow T to both abort and resolve the protocol, any PCS conversion performed by T after it aborted the protocol (and vice versa) can be traced to T and serve as a proof of T's misbehavior.
Analysis of the GJM Protocol
We used Mur' to perform nite-state analysis of the GJM protocol. Since abuse-freeness cannot be trivially represented as a state invariant, we employed a partial veri cation method described in section 5.4. Corrupt protocol participants were modeled as described in section 5.5. In the rest of this section, we analyze protocol correctness conditions, and suggest repairs to the protocol.
Fairness
First, we analyzed the protocol under the assumption that both participants are honest, i.e., neither tries to cheat the other. This also implies that neither participant knowingly cooperates with the intruder. Mur' discovered the same execution sequences as for the ASW protocol (see section 6.1), none of which is a violation of fairness as de ned in section 4.
There is an important di erence between the GJM protocol and the ASW protocol. In the latter, the intruder can directly resolve the protocol by submitting a resolve request to T once both me 1 and me 2 have been sent into the network as part of the exchange subprotocol. This is impossible in the GJM protocol since resolve requests must include the originating party's signature on the contract which the intruder cannot compute without cooperating with that party.
In the remainder of this subsection, we focus on the cases when at least one of the protocol participants is malicious or corrupt. For brevity, we omit the discussion of all combinations and concentrate on the most interesting insights about the protocol revealed by our analysis.
Weakly corrupt O, intruder monitors R ! T channel. We analyzed the protocol under the assumption that party O is malicious, i.e., its intention is to cheat R by obtaining R's signature of the contractual text m without releasing its own signature. O is weakly corrupt: it is willing to engage the intruder's help in obtaining R's signature, but will not sign or decrypt messages for the intruder.
The intruder I is assumed to have the ability to eavesdrop on and delay messages sent from R to T, but not to modify or remove them. Below we analyze the protocol under the assumption that the communication channel between R and T is inaccessible to the intruder. Recall the second fairness condition from section 4: once a correct participant (R) obtains an abort token from the trusted third party T, it should be impossible for any other participant to obtain a valid contract. This condition can be approximated by the following safety invariant: \it is never the case that the correct participant possesses the abort token, while some other participant possesses a valid contract, if the abort token was received rst." Clearly, the above attack violates this invariant.
The rst fairness condition is violated as well: the corrupt participant (O) obtained a valid contract without allowing the remaining participant (R) to also obtain a valid contract. The reason for this is that the only information from O that R has in its possession is PCS O (m; R; T) sent in message me 1 . This PCS can be converted into a universally-veri able signature either by O (who won't do this because it's corrupt), or by T (who won't do this because it has already aborted the protocol, and must send abort tokens in response to all requests). Therefore, R has no means to obtain O's universally-veri able signature of the contractual text m.
Since the fairness conditions from section 4 do not hold, we believe this attack is a bona de violation of fairness. Even though it can be argued that R implicitly agreed to sign the contract by sending its signature to T in message mr 1 , the fact that it received an abort token in response should guarantee that a contract has not be signed. Note the asymmetry between R and O here | since R may not initiate the abort subprotocol itself, the abort token serves as a proof to R that the protocol has been canceled by O, assuming T is honest. We also believe that this attack violates abuse-freeness (see section 8.3 below).
Weakly corrupt O, accidentally corrupt T. In order to stage the attack described in the previous section, the intruder must be able to access the communication channel between R and T. The original paper GJM99] speci es that communication between any participant and T is conducted over a private channel. In this case, the intruder will not be able to eavesdrop on message mr 1 sent by R to T in order to resolve the protocol, and will not be able to learn S-Sig R (m). In fact, even if R and T communicate over a public network, encrypting mr 1 with T's public key will prevent the intruder from splitting it into parts and reusing one of the parts to help O gain an unfair advantage. It is worth noting, however, that the protocol speci cation in GJM99] does not require that mr 1 be encrypted.
Now consider the case when the R ! T channel is secure, but T is accidentally corrupt, and I has passive access to all of its incoming communication (see section 5.5 for our de nition of accidental corruptness). This does not require active cooperation with the intruder on the part of T, just negligence in handling messages it receives from protocol participants. I does not need the ability to split messages into parts, remove them from the network, or even insert its own messages into the network. I only needs to make sure that T receives O's abort request ma 1 before it receives R's resolve request mr 1 . Scheduling the network to achieve this is not di cult if malicious O sends ma 1 to T prior to sending me 1 to R, while honest R receives me 1 , generates me 2 and then times out waiting for me 3 before sending mr 1 to T. Having passive access to T's communication with R is su cient for I to learn S-Sig R (m) and divulge it to O. Therefore, the attack succeeds in this case.
Trusted third party accountability
Suppose that T is accidentally corrupt and I successfully stages the attack described in section 8.1, causing R to lose fairness as a result. Since we are analyzing a TTP-accountable version of the GJM protocol (see section 7.4), we would like to verify whether the trusted third party T can be held accountable, i.e., if R loses fairness because of T's misbehavior, it must be able to prove the misbehavior to an arbiter or veri er in an external dispute.
For the purposes of our formal analysis, we followed the designers of the ASW protocol ASW98,ASW97] and assumed that the proof must consist of two inconsistent messages signed by T, e.g., an abort token and a converted PCS.
(Recall that in the TTP-accountable version of PCS, T-Sig R (m) obtained as a result of T's conversion of PCS R (m) is distinct from S-Sig R (m)). According to the protocol speci cation, T must process all requests on the rst-come, rst-served basis. Therefore, the rst request received by T determines the status of the contract in perpetuity, and it should never be the case that T issues an abort token and a converted PCS signature for the same contract.
However, if R loses fairness as a result of T's accidental corruption, it has no means of proving to an outside party that T is corrupt. O is in possession of genuine S-Sig R (m), not a converted PCS. If O is willing to lie about the source of this signature, then R cannot pin the blame on T. The only message signed by T is the abort token, and in the absence of two inconsistent messages signed by T, it is unclear what R can use as a proof to hold T accountable.
Since abort requests are signed, R can prove that the abort token it received from T was originally generated by O. But protocol speci cation allows for the case when O obtains a valid signature of R after sending o its abort request. This may happen if, for example, T received R's resolve request before O's abort request, resolved the protocol, and forwarded R's signature in response to O's abort request. O can also claim that it received R's signature directly from R.
At best, R can argue that either O, or T is lying: either O is lying that it received R's signature from T in response to its abort request, or T is lying that it received O's abort request before R's resolve request (in the latter case, T would not have sent the abort token in response to R's request). This is a very weak form of accountability | in e ect, the cheated party in a 3-party protocol is arguing that one of the other two is lying.
We believe that the di erence between the possibilities (O is corrupt, or T is corrupt) is too signi cant to allow any confusion between the two. The protocol is designed to withstand corrupt participants, so the fact that O is corrupt is fairly trivial. T, on the other hand, plays a crucial role due to its ability to resolve or abort contract signings, and any negligence or dishonesty on the part of T should be immediately detected and, if proved, should lead to revocation of T's authority to function as the trusted third party.
Abuse-freeness
We claim that the attack described in section 8.1 violates abuse-freeness of the protocol by giving the originator O both the power to determine the outcome of the protocol and the ability to prove this power to an outside arbiter A.
Suppose O uses A as a signature server | instead of signing messages to R with its own private key, it asks A to do the signing with A's private key to which O has no access. This way A can keep track of all signed messages generated by O in the protocol. If key certi cates are used, then A can initiate the exchange subprotocol with R under its own name, and O, using an intruder eavesdropping on the network and/or an accidentally corrupt T, will demonstrate that it can drive the protocol to the desired conclusion. In either case, A is able to maintain the list of all signatures generated by the originator of the exchange.
O obtains both S-Sig R (m) and S-Sig T (S-Sig O (m; O; R; abort)) by proceeding as in section 8.1. At this point, O is free to decide whether to enforce the contract using the former, or consider it aborted using the latter. Thus it has the power to determine the outcome of the protocol. It can prove this power by presenting both messages to A. Note that in this case an abort token will convince A that O has the power to abort the protocol since A keeps track of all signatures generated by O, and knows that at no point in the protocol did O generate its signature on the contract, S-Sig O (m). This is di erent from the case, considered in section 3.3, where O initiates the abort subprotocol with T after releasing its signature, and, therefore, O's possession of the abort token cannot serve as a proof that O is capable of aborting the protocol.
The argument about TTP accountability given in section 8.2 applies to abusefreeness as well as to fairness. If R is abused by O as a consequence of T's accidental corruption, R cannot prove to an outside arbiter that T misbehaved.
Repairing the protocol
The basic error in the GJM protocol can be attributed to the fact that data sent in the resolve subprotocol are exactly the same as data sent in the exchange subprotocol. The GJM protocol can therefore be repaired by replacing the standard signature in each resolve request with PCS. This was independently suggested by the authors of the protocol after we brought the attack described in section 8.1 to their attention Mac99].
In the repaired protocol, resolve requests from R to T will have the following form (requests from O to T are symmetric): mr 1 = PCS O (m; R; T); PCS R (m; O; T)
Our analysis of the repaired protocol did not uncover any attacks. Mur' conrmed that R still has the power to determine the outcome of the protocol after receiving the rst message from O (see section 5.4). However, the only information in R's possession at this point is PCS O (m; R; T), and R cannot use it to prove anything to an outside arbiter due to the designated veri er property of PCS (see section 7.2). We conclude that the repaired protocol is abuse-free. By contrast, the ASW protocol is not abuse-free. In the ASW protocol, R, too, has the power to determine the outcome after the rst message received from O, but since universally-veri able signatures are used, this power can be proved to an outside arbiter.
Unlike the original protocol, the repaired protocol is TTP-accountable. In the repaired protocol, T never receives universally-veri able signatures of the contract from either O, or R. Any universally-veri able signature leaked by corrupt T must be the result of PCS conversion, and its origin can be traced to T if the TTP-accountable version of PCS is used.
Mur' analysis indicates that the private channel assumption for communication between protocol participants and T can be relaxed. Even if the intruder can eavesdrop on messages exchanged with T, the protocol is still fair and abuse-free as long as the channels are resilient, i.e., every message is guaranteed to eventually reach its intended recipient. This is signi cant because this implies that the repaired protocol does not need to operate on top of a secrecy protocol, or use any form of encryption in order to guarantee fairness. The protocol can still be subject to cryptographic attacks on PCS and signature schemes and/or other attacks that could not have been discovered in the Mur' model. Additional analysis of the repaired protocol has been performed by Satyaki Das using the new-generation Mur' tool that relies on predicate abstractions to analyze in nite state spaces. It did not discover any attacks on an arbitrary number of protocol instances executed by di erent principals.
Conclusions
This study shows how a nite-state analysis tool can be used to study contract signing protocols and discover potential attacks and weaknesses. The main insights into the protocols are a weakness in the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner protocol and an error in the Garay-Jakobsson-MacKenzie protocol. In both cases, we give simple changes to one or two messages that eliminate these problems. Whatever usefulness the protocols might have in their original form, we believe that these small changes are clear improvements in the protocol that will be useful to anyone who wishes to use these or related protocols in practice. In addition, our Mur'-based analysis clari es the private-channel assumptions needed to guarantee protocol correctness.
Several modeling challenges arose in this study, since the properties involved in contract signing protocols are di erent and more subtle or more complex than the correctness conditions for common secrecy and authentication protocols studied extensively in the literature. The correctness properties for these protocols are fairness, third-party accountability, and abuse-freeness. While fairness and accountability can be determined from the traces of terminating protocol runs, abuse-freeness is not a trace-based property. The reason is that abuse relies on intermediate states where one party has the power to unilaterally determine whether or not a contract is produced. This is precisely the kind of property that has motivated researchers in concurrency theory to develop partial order models of concurrent systems Hoa85, Mil95] . Since Mur' is a trace-based tool, we can only formalize and check an approximation to abuse-freeness. More speci cally, we conjectured the states of protocol execution that allow one party power over the other and then veri ed our conjecture by Mur' analysis of a modi ed protocol environment. In this modi ed environment, an outside observer called the Challenger nondeterministically challenges one party to demonstrate power over the outcome of the protocol. If that party succeeds in meeting every challenge, then that party must have the power to determine the outcome. Moreover, veri cation that every challenge is met is a trace-based property. We believe that this method for verifying non-trace-based properties using trace-based tools may be useful for verifying control-related properties of other protocols.
Fair exchange protocols are a new area of application for formal methods, and speci cation of protocol guarantees in the form suitable for automated verication is still a challenge, especially in the case of such non-trivial properties as trusted third party accountability and abuse-freeness. We do believe that as online fair exchange and contract signing protocols gain increasing acceptance and a correspondingly high level of assurance is expected from them, formal techniques such as nite-state analysis will prove useful for uncovering interesting insights and non-obvious attacks.
